Foreign tax credit systems limit the extent to which foreign tax credits can be used to offset tax liability in the taxpayer's home country. We examine how two methods of limiting foreign tax credits, separate limitations based on type or source of income or an overall limitation aggregating across all foreign income, affect the optimal allocation of capital. We show that when investment opportunities exist in both low-tax and high-tax countries, a separate limitation method will always result in an inefficient allocation of capital. In some circumstances, an overall limitation can result in the optimal allocation of capital. In other cases, both limitation methods will result in an inefficient allocation of capital. In these cases either limitation method can be relatively more efficient. Simulations show that the potential differences in economic welfare under the alternative limitation methods can be significant. We consider the limitation methods in multiple settings, including the presence of pre-existing foreign income and allocation rules, such as interest allocation. JEL Subject Codes: H200, H210, H870
INTRODUCTION
Multinational corporations would potentially be subject to double taxation if their foreign income were taxed in both home and host countries. The avoidance of double taxation is desirable so as not to discourage the efficient international allocation of capital. Methods of relieving multinational corporations from double taxation include: (i) an exemption system, under which foreign income is not subject to tax in the home country; (ii) a foreign tax credit system, under which the home country provides a credit for taxes paid to foreign governments; and (iii) a deduction system, under which taxes paid to foreign governments are deducted from taxable income in the home country. These methods lead to different incentives for foreign investment. This paper seeks to examine the efficiency effects of the foreign tax credit system on the allocation of capital. In particular, we examine two alternative methods of implementing a foreign tax credit system that differ in the extent to which foreign tax credits can be used against home country tax liability.
Worldwide economic welfare is maximized when the marginal pre-tax return to a given amount of investment is equated across countries. Given differences in tax rates across countries and the accepted international principle that host countries have primacy in taxing income generated within their borders, the pre-tax return to investment can be equated across countries only under the condition of capital export neutrality.
Capital export neutrality is defined as occurring when a resident of a given country pays the same rate of tax without regard to the location of the investment. Capital export neutrality seeks to ensure that the location of a given investor's capital is unaffected by taxes. Under capital export neutrality, any given amount of total capital will be allocated domestically and abroad so as to maximize pre-tax income. Capital export neutrality occurs when the investor's home country provides a complete, unlimited, credit for taxes paid to host countries.
Although the United States provided an unlimited foreign tax credit in the early years of its tax system (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) , no country currently does so. Countries providing a foreign tax credit generally limit the foreign tax credit to the amount of tax that would otherwise be owed on the foreign income to the home country. The manner in which this limitation is calculated, however, varies.
In principle, at one extreme, the limitation could be calculated as a separate limitation for each specific transaction giving rise to foreign income. Given the severe technical complexity of separately keeping track of each transaction of a multinational corporation, more practical separate limitations are calculated on a per-country basis or on a per-"activity" basis, where activity is defined to include certain lines of business or other related transactions. 2, 3 In contrast to separate limitations, an overall limitation is calculated by aggregating across all foreign transactions of the taxpayer. Under an overall limitation, taxes paid on highly taxed transactions can be averaged with taxes paid on lightly taxed transactions. This averaging results in a larger tax credit on a given set of transactions than if the credit were calculated on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
The larger overall credit limitation-since it comes closer to the unlimited credit required for capital export neutrality-might be thought to be more efficient, in terms of maximizing worldwide economic welfare, than the separate credit limitation. This would be true if the averaging permitted under the overall limitation resulted in a smaller disincentive to invest in high-tax foreign countries than under a separate limitation calculation. The overall credit limitation has been criticized, however, for providing tax incentives to seek out opportunities to earn income on lightly taxed foreign transactions when an investor already has highly taxed sources of foreign income. For example, as argued in President Reagan's 1985 tax proposal:
[T]he averaging permitted by an overall limitation gives taxpayers with operations in a high tax country an incentive to invest in low tax countries. For a taxpayer with excess foreign tax credits, low tax country investments may be more attractive than investments in the United States that generate higher pretax income simply because of the possibility of using the excess credits to offset a portion of the U.S. tax otherwise due…The overall limitation under current law thus causes economic decisions to be distorted purely for tax advantage. 4 Debate on the best method of limiting the foreign tax credit continues in the United States today. Current advocates for reform of the U.S. foreign tax credit system include those advocating adherence to a per-country limitation 5 and those advocating a reduced number of baskets providing greater opportunity for cross-crediting business income. 6 2 Alternative possible limitation systems are considered in the study by the American Law Institute (1987), pp. 317-332. 3 Although the tax credit system of the United Kingdom is sometimes referred to as an item-by-item system, the system historically has been noted to permit a "do-it-yourself" overall limitation. Under the U.K. system, a dividend from a foreign subsidiary is treated as a single item. Through the use of offshore holding companies or "mixer" companies, dividends from various sources and countries could be combined, with credit relief provided for the taxes underlying these dividends. See Inland Revenue (1999) Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, May 1985, p. 387. 5 See, for example, Peroni (2003) and Peroni, Fleming, and Shay (2003) . These authors advocate a percountry limitation with two baskets per country: a general category and a passive income category, viewing this as closest to the "theoretical ideal of an actual item-by-item approach to limiting the foreign tax credit" (Peroni, Fleming, and Shay, p. 122 The problem addressed in this paper is to identify the conditions under which either the separate or overall limitation is most efficient, where efficiency is measured in terms of maximizing worldwide pre-tax income. 7 We examine these different limitations in a three-country model, where an investor in a capital exporting country is choosing how to allocate a given amount of capital between two foreign countries. 8 Our conclusions are that where the limitation methods result in different capital allocations, either method can be relatively more efficient than the other depending on the particular tax rates of the foreign countries relative to the home country tax rate. We find that the overall limitation maximizes worldwide efficiency if at the efficient allocation of capital the investor does not have excess credits. When this condition does not hold, neither the overall limitation nor the per-country limitation will result in an efficient allocation of capital. In these cases, either method can be relatively more efficient than the other.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II provides some additional discussion of the distinction between separate and overall foreign tax credit limitations with reference to the foreign tax credit system of the United States. Section III presents the basic model and simulations. Section IV presents additional extensions of the model, considering the effects of pre-existing sources of income and other features of the tax system that affect the allocation of deductions between foreign and domestic income. Conclusions are presented in the final section.
II. THE U.S. FOREIGN TAX CREDIT SYSTEM
The United States taxes its residents on a worldwide basis, permitting taxpayers to claim a credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign income. 9 Historically the tax law has swung back and forth between the overall and per-country limitations, leading some to conclude that "there simply has been no consistent Congressional view of the policy underlying limitation issues."
10 The current method of computing the limitation is perhaps best is estimated to reduce tax receipts by $8.2 billion over the 2004 -2013 period. See Joint Committee on Taxation (2003 . 7 In this paper we assume it is desirable to maximize worldwide welfare. We do not argue, however, that it is necessarily in a government's interest to unilaterally adopt such a policy. Holding the behavior of other governments fixed, it has been shown that (for a given capital stock) it is optimal for a government to choose national neutrality (under which foreign taxes are deducted from taxable income rather than being credited) over capital export neutrality (Richman, 1963) . Others note that once other governments are allowed to respond such a policy would likely prompt retaliation ultimately resulting in a significantly smaller economic pie to be taxed by all governments. See, for example, the discussion in Hufbauer (1992) , pp. 55-57. 8 Altshuler and Fulghieri (1994) and Hines (1994) provide a model examining investment incentives under the foreign tax credit system. They do not consider, however, the effect of the different limitation methods on investment choices. 9 For an overview of U.S. international tax rules, see Ault and Bradford (1990 described as a blend of the separate and overall limitation methods discussed in the introduction. While as a general principle the tax credit is calculated under an overall limitation, certain types of income are segregated from the general calculation with a separate limitation applying to these special categories of income.
Since 1986 these separate limitations apply to each of the following eight types of income: (i) passive income, (ii) high withholding tax interest income (generally defined as interest subject to a foreign withholding tax of 5 percent or more), (iii) financial services income, (iv) shipping income, (v) dividends from foreign corporations in which the taxpayer has at least a 10 percent ownership but which is not majority owned by U.S. shareholders (i.e., noncontrolled section 902 corporations), (vi) dividends from a domestic international sales corporation, (vii) taxable income attributable to foreign trade income, and (viii) distributions from a foreign sales corporation. 11 Most other income not classified into these eight separate categories is aggregated within a ninth, "general limitation" category.
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Tax credits not usable in a given year due to the credit limitation on the particular income category may be carried back two years and forward five years, subject to the credit limitation in the year in which the credit is carried. Because credits carried forward do not accrue interest, credits carried forward have a reduced value relative to credits used immediately or able to be carried back.
Despite these many separate limitation categories, most foreign-source income earned by U.S. multinationals is classified as general limitation income. 13 The purpose of the special limitation categories, many of which were added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, is to limit the foreign tax credit attributable to the inclusion of income which is either likely to be very lightly taxed or very heavily taxed.
14 The policy rationale for these separate limitations seems to be a view that the foreign tax credit is intended simply to prevent double taxation of income.
15 Under this view, foreign income taxed at rates below the U.S. rate of tax should be subject to U.S. taxes with a full foreign tax credit 11 Within each of these eight separate limitation categories, the limit is generally calculated by aggregating all taxes on income meeting the given definition. 12 Certain other limitations are created by other special tax rules. For example, the tax credit is denied for taxes paid to certain countries with which the United States has severed diplomatic relations, and the corresponding income is separately limited. The foreign tax credit limitations are also re-calculated under rules for the alternative minimum tax. 13 In 1998, 74 percent of foreign-source taxable income was classified as general limitation income. Further, an additional 19 percent of foreign income was financial services income earned by the financial service industry. Almost all (93 percent) of the foreign income of the financial services industry is classified as financial services income, resulting in this category being a kind of "general" limitation for the industry. See Singmaster and Heilbroner (2002) for additional data. 14 In the analysis of the limitation methods we do not take into consideration the possibility of foreign losses. A concern that foreign losses not reduce tax on U.S. income may lead one to favor an overall limitation over separate limitations. This was one reason for the elimination of the per-country limitation by the United States in 1976 (see Joint Committee on Taxation, 1976), although other rules could be designed to deal with this concern. 15 As noted in the introduction, there may also be efficiency motivations behind the separate limitations to prevent the misallocation of investment (e.g., so as not to provide tax incentives to earn lightly taxed income).
while foreign income taxed at rates in excess of the U.S. rate should be effectively exempted from U.S. tax by the credit. The separate limitations reduce the ability to use foreign tax credits generated from heavily taxed income to reduce the U.S. tax on lightly taxed income. Of course, U.S. tax law does not consistently adopt this view since the majority of income is subject to the single overall general limitation.
III. EFFICIENCY IN A SINGLE-PERIOD MODEL OF MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT
The model presented in this section seeks to capture the most significant elements of the tax system necessary to examine the efficiency effects of the different limitation methods in a single-period model. The model focuses on how the limitation methods affect the allocation of capital between high-tax and low-tax foreign countries.
We consider a single investor in a capital-exporting country with foreign subsidiaries in two capital-importing countries. Only equity investment in the foreign subsidiaries is considered. 16 The investor has a fixed amount of initial wealth W 0 to be allocated between the two foreign countries A and B in amounts K A and K B (W 0 = K A + K B ). Investment in countries A and B earns pre-tax income of F(K A ) and G(K B ), respectively. We assume the marginal product of capital is positive and declining in each country.
Countries A and B levy taxes on income at rates τ A and τ B , respectively. For simplicity, we assume that (i) taxable income is equivalent to true income in each jurisdiction and (ii) no withholding taxes are imposed on dividends. 17 Without loss in generality, we define countries A and B such that τ A ≤ τ B . The investor is subject to home country taxes at rate τ H on dividends and deemed dividends, with a foreign tax credit provided for taxes paid to countries A and B. The investor seeks to maximize end-of-period after-tax wealth.
18
In the model, the foreign tax credit is alternatively assumed to be subject to a per-country limitation or an overall limitation. The model is used to compare the manner in which the investor chooses to allocate capital under each limitation method. The allocation that results in the greatest pre-tax income is the most efficient limitation method.
In the model, the only decision the investor makes is the amount of capital to allocate at the start of the period to Country A, with the residual amount being allocated to Country B. The allocation that maximizes pre-tax income requires the marginal product of capital to be equal in countries A and B. The allocation that maximizes after-tax income equates 16 The model abstracts from a variety of interesting features in multinational investment, including portfolio investment, debt finance, hybrid entities, and transfer pricing, to focus on the effect of the different limitation methods.
17 Differences in the measure of income and positive withholding taxes can be subsumed in the tax rates τ A and τ B . An exception is in the case of allocation and apportionment rules that may allocate deductions (or income) on the basis of economic activity in each country. For a consideration of how U.S. interest allocation rules affect the efficiency of the limitation methods see Section IV. 18 The appendix provides further detail of the model and results.
the after-tax marginal product of capital in each country, where the applicable tax rate in each country depends on the limitation method.
The one-period model is helpful in developing an understanding for the relative efficiency of the different limitation methods. It can also be thought of representing a multi-period model in which the home country does not allow for deferral.
There are three possible orderings of tax rates to consider:
It is straightforward to show that under each of the first two orderings both limitation methods result in identical investment allocations. 19 As a result, we focus our attention on the third ordering where the tax rate in one of the foreign countries exceeds the home country tax rate and the other foreign country has a tax rate less than the home country tax rate. When τ A < τ H < τ B , investment decisions will be made differently under the two limitation methods. Several interesting results emerge: (i) the per-country limitation will result in an inefficient allocation of capital; (ii) the overall limitation can result in either an efficient or an inefficient allocation of capital; and (iii) either limitation method can be relatively more efficient than the other.
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A. Inefficiency of the Per-Country Limitation
The per-country limitation always is inefficient for τ A < τ H < τ B . The efficient allocation of capital requires that the pre-tax return to a marginal unit of capital be equated between countries A and B. The investor, however, wishes to maximize after-tax income, which requires the after-tax return to a marginal unit of capital be equated between countries A and B. Because investment in Country A will pay tax at the home country tax rate (which is less than the tax rate in Country B), the investor allocates more capital to Country A than is efficient.
B. Optimality of the Overall Limitation under Certain Conditions
The overall limitation, in contrast to the per-country limitation, can result in the efficient allocation of capital between countries A and B. It is straightforward to show that if, at the efficient allocation of capital, home country tax liability equals or exceeds the tax paid to foreign countries then the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation of capital. This result occurs because foreign taxes will be fully credited in this case. 19 Under the first tax rate ordering, the home country tax rate will be paid on income regardless of source. As a result, investment decisions are made optimally. The allocation that maximizes pre-tax income also maximizes after-tax income under either limitation method. Under the second tax rate ordering, foreign income is effectively exempted from home country tax under either limitation method. In this case, assuming strict inequalities in the tax rate orderings, capital will be allocated inefficiently, but identically, under either limitation method. (If the tax rates in countries A and B are identical and exceed the home country rate, then there will be no inefficiency in the allocation of capital between countries A and B. Capital will be allocated efficiently given the model's assumption that there is a fixed amount of capital for foreign investment.) 20 A derivation of these results is provided in the appendix.
Because the return to a marginal unit of capital will be taxed at the home country rate regardless of where it is located, the investor allocates capital so as to maximize its pretax return.
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C. Inefficiency of the Overall Limitation under Certain Conditions
The overall limitation results in an inefficient allocation of capital when, at the efficient allocation of capital, home country tax liability is less than the tax paid to foreign countries. In this case the investor has an incentive to change the allocation of capital from the efficient allocation since the after-tax return to a unit of capital is greater in Country A than in Country B. As described in the appendix, the investor will either continue to allocate capital to Country A until (i) total foreign tax payments to countries A and B are just equal to home country tax liability or (ii) the after-tax return to a marginal unit of capital is equated between countries A and B taking into account only source country taxes. In either case, too much capital will be allocated to Country A.
D. A Comparison of the Per-Country and Overall Limitations
The comparison of the per-country and overall limitations reveals that for τ A < τ H < τ B there are conditions under which either method can be relatively more efficient than the other. The efficient allocation is achieved under the overall limitation if at the efficient allocation the home country tax liability is greater than or equal to foreign country tax payments. When this does not hold, the overall limitation method is inefficient and, since the per-country limitation method is always inefficient, either limitation method can be relatively more efficient than the other. are the corresponding amounts of income generated in each country under this allocation. By assumption,
(home country tax liability exceeds foreign country tax liability at the optimal allocation). We know that of all possible allocations of capital that result in the home country tax liability exceeding foreign country tax liability, the allocation * A K and * B K will maximize after-tax income since it is the allocation maximizing pre-tax income (i.e., the allocation that maximizes
if there is some other allocation of capital, say A K ′ and B K ′ , that maximizes after-tax income, it must be the case that total foreign tax liability exceeds home country tax liability at this allocation, i.e.,
. But this results in a contradiction: if this were true then
is greater than the foreign after-tax profits at A K ′ and B K ′ ), the allocation A K ′ and B K ′ cannot maximize after-tax income. Therefore we conclude the optimal allocation of capital will always be chosen under the overall limitation if the home country tax liability exceeds foreign country tax liability at the optimal allocation. III. We demonstrate the differing efficiency results for the cases with τ A < τ H < τ B , where a specific functional form is assumed for the profit earned in each country. Specifically, profit in Country A is assumed to be of the form
, where we let α = β = 0.5. The home country tax rate τ H is set at 35 percent. The tax rate for Country A, τ A , is allowed to vary from 0 to just under 35 percent and the tax rate for Country B, τ B , varies from just over 35 percent to just under 100 percent.
Given that the profit functions in both countries are identical, the efficient allocation places an equal amount of capital in each country. As shown in Figure 1 , the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation provided (τ A + τ B )/2 ≤ τ H . This is because for these tax rate combinations when capital is equally divided between both countries, home country tax liability will be greater than or equal to foreign tax payments. As a result, the investor maximizes after-tax income by maximizing pre-tax income for these tax rate combinations.
If (τ A + τ B )/2 > τ H , the overall limitation method is inefficient, and can be relatively more or less efficient that the per-country limitation. As shown in Figure 1 , the overall limitation is inefficient yet more efficient than the per-country limitation for the unshaded region of tax rate combinations (the region bounded by the line denoting (τ A + τ B )/2 = τ H and the parabola). In this region the overall limitation does not result in the efficient allocation of capital because foreign tax payments at the efficient allocation of capital exceed home country tax liability. As a result, the investor can increase after-tax profits by allocating more capital to the low-tax country than under the efficient allocation. In this region, however, if the investor attempted to equalize the after-tax return to a marginal unit of capital in Country A and Country B, so much income would be earned in the low-tax country that the home country tax liability would exceed total foreign tax payments (thereby defeating the advantage of transferring capital to Country A). The investor thus only deviates from the efficient allocation of capital by allocating additional capital to Country A until total foreign tax payments are just equal to the home country tax liability. Within this region, this allocation is relatively more efficient than the allocation resulting under the per-country limitation.
Finally, for certain tax rate combinations, the per-country limitation is relatively more efficient than the overall limitation. In this region the investor under the overall limitation would either (i) continue to follow the strategy of transferring additional capital to Country A until total foreign tax payments just equaled home country tax liability or (ii) be able to transfer enough capital to Country A in order to equate the after-tax return to a marginal unit of capital in Country A and Country B and still have total foreign tax payments exceed home country tax liability. In this latter case under the overall limitation the investor equates the after-tax returns to a unit of capital in both countries.
The investor faces a tax rate of τ B on additional income earned in the high-tax country under both limitation methods. Under the overall limitation the investor faces a tax rate of τ A on additional income earned in the low-tax country. Under the per-country limitation the investor faces the higher tax rate τ H on income earned in the low-tax country. The investor subject to a per-country limitation will over-invest in Country A by less than an investor subject to the overall limitation. While investment in Country A is favored under both limitation methods, it is favored by less under the per-country limitation. Figure 2 shows the percentage of foreign capital allocated to the low-tax country assuming the tax rate τ B in the high-tax country is 50 percent, τ H is 35 percent, and τ A is allowed to vary between 0 and 35 percent. Under the per-country limitation, 62.825 percent of capital is allocated to the low-tax country for all τ A . Under the overall limitation, for τ A less than or equal to 20 percent the efficient amount of capital (50 percent) is allocated to the low-tax country. For τ A between 20 and 25 percent, the investor deviates from the efficient allocation of capital under the overall limitation by allocating additional capital to Country A until total foreign tax payments are just equated to home country tax liability. For part of this region, for τ A between 20 and 23.5 percent, the overall limitation results in a relatively more efficient allocation of capital than the per-country limitation. For τ A greater than 23.5 percent, however, the overall limitation is less efficient than the per-country limitation.
The figure shows there is an interesting relationship under the overall limitation between the percent of capital allocated to the low-tax country and its tax rate. For τ A between 20 and 25 percent, increases in τ A result in increased investment in Country A. This occurs because in this interval the investor constrains investment in the low-tax country by the desire to equate total foreign tax payments to home country tax liability. As τ A increases in this interval, the investor is able to place more investment in Country A and still equate foreign tax payments to home country tax liability. Once τ A reaches 25 percent, the investor is no longer constrained to equate foreign tax payments to home country tax liability because τ A is sufficiently high that total foreign tax payments exceed home country tax liability at the allocation of capital maximizing after-tax income. Further increases in τ A then have the expected effect of reducing investment in Country A.
E. Efficiency Boundary Between Overall and Per-Country Limitations
Figure 2 provides the graphical intuition for how to find the locus of tax rate combinations where the per-country limitation becomes more efficient than the overall limitation. Under the per-country limitation, for a given τ B and τ H , the profit-maximizing choice of capital, K A , is independent of τ A . 22 Under the overall limitation method, for τ A +τ B ≤ 2τ H , the profit-maximizing choice of capital is the efficient solution. When τ A +τ B = 2τ H , the value of the Lagrangian multiplier in the constrained optimization problem is one (see appendix). Because of the smoothness of the profit functions, we can find a region where the investor continues to increase capital in the low-tax country as τ A increases (holding τ B and τ H fixed) until the value of the Lagrangian multiplier is zero.
The value where this occurs is precisely where the after-tax marginal profits are equalized. By our earlier discussion, we know that when this condition holds the amount of capital invested in the low-tax country is greater than under the per-country limitation.
Therefore, we know that there is a single-crossing value of τ A at which the per-country limitation becomes more efficient than the overall limitation for a given τ B . Examining these crossing values for every τ B , we find that the efficiency boundary is a parabola.
F. Welfare
Along with understanding when each of the limitation methods is more efficient, we also consider the relative welfare losses of one method versus the other. We use the same example above with the functional form for profit in Country A given by
, where we let α = β = 0.5. We first determine the after-tax profit-maximizing allocation of capital under each of the limitation methods for each combination of tax pairs (τ A , τ B ), assuming τ H = .35. We then compare the pre-tax profits arising under each limitation method, given these aftertax profit-maximizing allocations of capital. Figure 3 graphs the difference in pre-tax profits under the two limitation methods. Specifically, we have graphed the pre-tax profit arising under the overall limitation less the pre-tax profit arising under the per-country limitation. Where the amount is positive, the overall limitation is more efficient than the per-country limitation. 22 See appendix for proof.
The figure shows that the welfare differences can be quite large between the two limitation methods. For example, given our production functions and assuming total foreign capital of 100 units, maximum total pre-tax profit is 2(50 .5 )=14.14. The theoretical maximum possible welfare difference would occur if all capital were located in a single country under one limitation method but were allocated efficiently under the other limitation method, in which case the welfare loss would be 4.14. The figure shows the welfare advantages of the overall limitation can lead to relatively large efficiency gains over the per-country limitation when τ B is relatively large and τ A is relatively small. For example, for (τ A , τ B ) = (.05,.75), the overall limitation results in total income being 1.1 units higher, an increase in income over the per-country limitation of more than 8 percent. This occurs despite the fact that the overall limitation does not result in a firstbest allocation of capital. For more extreme tax rate differences, the overall limitation can result in higher incomes of more than 3 units, an increase in income over the percountry limitation of as much as 25 percent.
As seen in the figure, the overall limitation is more efficient except for the region to the right of the parabola solved for in Section E. Within the region where the per-country limitation is more efficient, the gain is not as significant relative to the potential inefficiency of this method for other tax rate combinations. Here, the maximum amount by which the income under the per-country limitation method exceeds that under the overall limitation is 0.35 units, less than a three percent gain over the overall limitation method.
IV. EXTENSION OF MODEL RESULTS
In this section we consider the effects on capital allocation under each limitation method from two extensions to the basic model: pre-existing foreign profits and allocation and apportionment rules.
A. Pre-Existing Foreign Profits
One criticism of the overall limitation method is that when an investor has pre-existing foreign profits, the overall limitation may affect the allocation of subsequent foreign investment. We see in this section that the overall limitation may be either more efficient or less efficient in the presence of pre-existing foreign income.
We consider this possibility in the single-period model by assuming that the investor is deciding how to allocate a fixed amount of new capital between the two foreign countries, given that the investor also has a fixed amount of profits coming from a third foreign country.
Under the per-country limitation, the profits from the third foreign country will not alter the allocation of capital from that found in the earlier model.
In the case of the overall limitation, the effect on the allocation of investment depends on whether the third country is a high-tax or low-tax country. Let us denote the third foreign country as Country C, with tax rate τ C .
Let us initially assume τ C exceeds τ H . Several effects can be observed. First, for a given τ B , the range of τ A for which the taxpayer is in excess limitation at the efficient allocation of capital is smaller than in the absence of this additional high-taxed foreign income. As noted in Section III, the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation of capital if, at the efficient allocation of capital, the taxpayer does not have excess credits. In terms of Figure 1 , the region in which the overall limitation is efficient contracts (the line denoting the boundary of this region shifts to the left). Second, for a given τ B , the region in which the overall limitation was previously inefficient occurs for a larger range of τ A . The presence of additional high-taxed foreign income allows a greater amount of investment to be undertaken in the low-tax country without creating excess limitation. This results in a greater inefficiency in the region in which foreign tax payments were previously equal to home country tax payments. Third, the region in which the taxpayer has excess credits and allocates capital to equate the after-tax marginal products of capital (taking into account only the source country tax rates) occurs for a larger range of τ A than previously.
In this region the per-country limitation is unambiguously more efficient than the overall limitation. As a result, the range in which the per-country limitation is more efficient expands and the range in which the overall limitation is more efficient contracts.
Figure 4 presents these results using the same assumptions for the numerical simulation of the model in Section III. We assume
additionally assume τ C = 50 percent and third-country pre-tax income equal to (50) 0.5 . Given these assumptions, the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation of capital for ) ( 2 ) (
, the investor either (i) allocates capital between Country A and Country B so as to exactly equate foreign taxes in all three countries to home country tax or (ii) is in an excess credit position and equates the after-tax return to a unit of capital in Country A and Country B, taking into account only source-country taxes. In a portion of the region in which foreign taxes are equated to home country tax the overall limitation is more efficient than the per-country limitation. In the region in which the taxpayer is in an excess credit position, the percountry limitation is more efficient than the overall limitation. Figure 5 shows how the percent of capital allocated to the low-tax country changes as a function of the low-tax country tax rate, holding τ B equal to 50 percent. Once τ A exceeds 5 percent, capital allocation under the overall limitation is distorted, but it remains more efficient than the per-country limitation until τ A exceeds 10 percent. Once τ A exceeds 14 percent, the taxpayer is in an excess credit position under the overall limitation and further increases in τ A reduce the amount of investment in the low-tax country. 23 When this inequality holds, home country tax liability will be greater than or equal to total taxes paid to all foreign countries. The opposite conclusion emerges if the pre-existing foreign income is lightly taxed. If τ C < τ H , for a given τ B , the range of τ A for which the taxpayer is in excess limitation at the efficient allocation of capital is greater than in the absence of this income. In terms of Figure 1 , the region in which the overall limitation is optimal expands (the line denoting the boundary of this region shifts to the right). Second, the region in which the taxpayer has excess credits and allocates capital to equate the after-tax marginal products of capital (taking into account only the source country tax rates) requires a greater value of τ A than previously. It is in this region that the per-country limitation is unambiguously more efficient than the overall limitation. As a result, the range in which the per-country limitation is more efficient contracts and the range in which the overall limitation is more efficient expands. 
B. Allocation Rules
We consider the effect of allocation rules on the efficiency of the limitation methods by adding the U.S. interest allocation rules to the single-period model (and again considering only two foreign countries).
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Interest expenses of U.S. multinationals must be allocated between domestic and foreign income. This allocation only affects the calculation of foreign tax credits, not worldwide income subject to U.S. tax or foreign taxes actually paid. Under the overall limitation, firms in excess limitation are not affected by the allocation of interest expense between domestic and foreign sources. Firms with excess foreign credits face a higher tax burden if interest deductions are allocated from domestic sources to foreign sources. Assuming positive domestic income, the interest deduction against domestic income would have reduced U.S. tax liability, but the foreign income is already sheltered from U.S. tax by foreign tax credits and the deduction against foreign income goes unused.
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The interest allocation rules are modeled by assuming there is a fixed amount of debt incurred in the home country. 26 Under the U.S. allocation rules, interest deductions arising from this debt are allocated to each foreign country in proportion to the amount of capital in the foreign country relative to the investor's total domestic and foreign capital. Because in our model we assume the total amount of foreign capital is fixed, the total amount of interest deductions to be allocated to foreign sources is fixed, but the allocation to each of the foreign countries depends on the proportion of foreign capital allocated to each country. Also, given the assumption that the total amount of foreign capital is fixed, we cannot show how interest allocation affects the allocation of capital between domestic and overall foreign use; instead we demonstrate its effect on the allocation of capital between the high-tax and low-tax foreign countries under each limitation method.
Under the per-country limitation, in the absence of interest allocation the after-tax marginal returns to capital are equated by the investor, where the applicable tax rates are the home country rate τ H for income earned in the low-tax country and τ B in the high-tax country. As described in Section III, too much capital is allocated to the low-tax country. With interest allocation, shifting a unit of capital from the high-tax country to the low-tax country causes interest deductions to be shifted from the high-tax country to the low-tax country for home country tax purposes. This shift in interest deductions confers a net benefit to the investor: the investor receives no benefit from interest deductions allocated to the high-tax country but can reduce home country tax by τ H for each dollar of interest income allocated to the low-tax country. As a result, the investor allocates more capital to the low-tax country than in the absence of the interest allocation rules. The allocation of capital is more inefficient than before. Interest allocation can also cause the low-tax country to be in an excess credit position. This too will cause more capital to be allocated to the low-tax country than in the absence of interest allocation.
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Under the overall limitation, if the investor remains in excess limitation at the efficient allocation of capital, interest allocation has no effect on tax liability or on the allocation of capital. Also, if the investor would have excess credits in the absence of interest allocation, interest allocation has an effect of increasing home country tax liability (through the loss in interest deductions against domestic income) but does not change the allocation of capital. But for other tax positions, the attribution of a deduction to foreign income without changing actual foreign taxes paid is similar to the case considered 26 U.S. interest allocation rules ignore any foreign debt that may exist. 27 Let X denote the total amount of interest expense to be allocated to foreign sources. If the investor remains in an excess limit position then it chooses K A to maximize
More capital is invested in the low-tax country than in the absence of interest allocation. If at this solution the interest allocation rules cause the investor to be in an excess credit position, the investor may either (i) reduce the amount of capital in the low-tax country from that implied by this solution so as to equate foreign tax payments in Country A to home country tax liability on this income or (ii) allocate capital as an investor with excess credits in each country would choose by equating the after-tax return to capital in each country taking into account only source-country taxes: i.e., investing in the low-tax country until
earlier of pre-existing high-tax income. The investor is more likely to be in an excess credit position at the efficient allocation of capital. The investor will respond by increasing the amount of investment in the low-tax country to either (i) equate total foreign taxes to home country liability (net of the interest allocation deduction) or (ii) have excess credits at the chosen allocation and allocate capital to equate the after-tax marginal products of capital (taking into account only the source country tax rates). In general, for a given τ B , interest allocation reduces the range of τ A for which the taxpayer is in excess limitation at the efficient allocation of capital. The range of potential tax rate combinations for which the overall limitation is efficient is reduced and the region in which the overall limitation is inefficient is increased (and in part of this latter region the degree of inefficiency is exacerbated).
Because interest allocation makes the per-country limitation more inefficient and, for some tax rate combinations, makes the overall limitation more inefficient, the effect on the relative efficiency of the limitation methods is ambiguous. The effect will depend on the range of tax rates considered, the specification of the profit functions, and the magnitude of the interest allocation deductions relative to foreign income. Figure 8 presents results for a numerical simulation. We assume
, and additionally assume that the amount of interest to be allocated to foreign sources is equal to one percent of total foreign capital. Given these assumptions, the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation of capital for
28 Given a home country tax rate of 35 percent, the capital allocation will be efficient under the overall limitation for ≤ + ) ( slightly in excess of this value, the overall limitation is no longer optimal, but it remains more efficient than the per-country limitation. Once the overall limitation is no longer optimal, for a given value of τ B , increases in τ A initially make the overall limitation more distorted relative to the optimal allocation until the investor is in an excess credit position. At this point, further increases in τ A reduce the degree of inefficiency under the overall limitation. In contrast, the per-country allocation is inefficient for all τ A and τ B . We find in the simulation, for a given value of τ B , only for intermediate values of τ A is the per-country limitation relatively more efficient than the overall limitation. At sufficiently high values of τ A , the investor has excess credits in the low-tax country under the percountry limitation. In this case, the investor would also have excess credits under the overall limitation so capital is allocated in the same manner under both limitation methods. 28 The firm is in excess limitation under the overall limitation at the optimal allocation of capital if
, where the second term on the lefthand side represents the interest allocation. Assuming total foreign capital of 100 units and substituting the functional form for the profit functions yields the inequality
, where 50 is the optimal allocation of capital in each foreign country.
V. Conclusions
Under a principle of capital export neutrality the location of investment would not be affected by taxation. Given differences in tax rates across countries, capital export neutrality can generally only be achieved by providing an unlimited foreign tax credit. Various limitation methods, such as the separate and overall limitations, will generally distort the efficient allocation of capital.
When investment opportunities exist in both low-tax and high-tax locations, we have shown that one form of a separate limitation-the per-country limitation-always results in an inefficient allocation of capital. In a single-period model, the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation of capital if at this allocation the investor does not have excess credits. When this condition does not hold, either limitation method can be relatively more efficient. Simulations show that the potential differences in economic welfare under the alternative limitation methods can be significant.
We also consider how investment choices under the limitation methods may be affected by the presence of pre-existing highly taxed or lightly taxed foreign income. The ranges of tax rates over which the overall limitation results in the efficient allocation of capital are affected by pre-existing income. It has been correctly argued, for example in President Reagan's 1985 tax proposal cited in the introduction, that under the overall limitation taxpayers with pre-existing highly taxed income may over-invest in low-tax countries relative to the efficient allocation of capital. However, it is also the case that the overall limitation leads to the efficient allocation of capital over a wider range of tax rates when the taxpayer has pre-existing lightly taxed income.
Allocation rules, such as those of the United States providing for interest allocation, further affect the efficiency of the limitation methods. It is shown that these allocation rules can provide a further inefficiency of per-country limitations, increasing the incentive to invest in low-tax countries. This additional inefficiency may increase the range over which the overall limitation results in a more efficient allocation of capital.
These results are found in a relatively simple, stylized model of foreign investment. Perhaps the most striking result is the difficulty of ensuring the optimal allocation of capital in a world with a single investor from a single capital-exporting country.
Interesting extensions of the model might examine whether allowing for additional dimensions of investor behavior (for example, alternative financing methods or use of alternative ownership structures) increases or decreases the differences between the limitation methods.
Appendix. Model Analysis
The mathematical derivation of the model is presented here.
As described in the text, we consider a single investor in a capital-exporting country with foreign subsidiaries in two capital-importing countries. Only equity investment in the foreign subsidiaries is considered. The investor has a fixed amount of initial wealth W 0 to be allocated between the two foreign countries A and B in nonnegative amounts K imply that some investment in each country will occur. Countries A and B levy taxes on income at rates τ A and τ B , respectively. Without loss in generality, we define countries A and B such that τ A ≤ τ B . The investor is subject to home country taxes at rate τ H on this income, with a foreign tax credit provided for taxes paid to countries A and B. The investor seeks to maximize after-tax income at the end of the period.
The foreign tax credit is alternatively assumed to be subject to a per-country or an overall limitation. It can be shown that the limitation methods result in identical capital
29 Hence, we consider only the case where τ A < τ H < τ B , below. Derivation of the investor's maximization problem for each limitation is presented below, followed by an analysis of the efficiency consequences of each limitation.
A1. Per-Country Limitation
Under the per-country limitation, the investor maximizes after-tax income by choosing K A and K B to solve the program:
In this case the taxpayer makes full use of tax credits generated in Country A, but has excess tax credits for taxes paid to Country B. Maximization leads to the first-order condition
Relative to the allocation of capital that maximizes pre-tax income, too little capital is allocated to Country B. The pre-tax marginal product of capital in Country A is forced below that in Country B. Taxes cause too little investment in Country B and too much investment in Country A. Capital is allocated inefficiently. Equation (A2) yields another important result. The solution for the optimal allocation of capital is independent of τ A .
A2. Overall Limitation
Two separate cases must be considered, identified as OL Case I and OL Case II.
In this case the investor is fully able to use all foreign tax credits without limitation. The investor maximizes after-tax income by choosing K A and K B to solve the program:
The resulting first-order condition is
. This results in the allocation of capital that maximizes pre-tax income. There are no tax-induced distortions in the allocation of capital. Capital is allocated first-best efficient.
OL Case
In this case the investor is constrained in the use of foreign tax credits by the overall limitation. The investor maximizes after-tax income by choosing K A and K B to solve the program:
Substituting the first constraint holding total capital fixed yields the following Lagrangian:
The Kuhn-Tucker Conditions that result are: 30 We ignore the nonnegativity constraints on K A and K B since the regularity conditions F′(0) = G′(0) = ∞ ensure that they are not binding.
We then consider two sub-cases, depending on whether the constraint binds.
If the constraint does not bind, then λ = 0. This implies, that
Too little capital is allocated to Country B relative to the allocation of capital that maximizes pre-tax income. Capital is allocated inefficiently. Furthermore, we know that capital is allocated more inefficiently than under the per-country limitation because:
Therefore, the bias under the overall limitation is greater than under the per-country limitation.
If the constraint binds, λ > 0, and from equation (A7) we know that the firm equalizes taxes between the two countries, i.e.
In this case, λ, the shadow price of forgiving tax collections by the home country of one dollar of excess limitation, is defined as:
The shadow price can be interpreted as follows. The numerator is the increase in aftertax profit if a unit of capital were allowed to be reallocated from Country B to Country A and the resulting excess limitation were forgiven by the home country. The denominator is the reduction in home country tax payments due to the tax forgiven.
At the point where τ A + τ B = 2τ H , we know that the overall limitation yields the efficient allocation of capital. That is to say, that F′(K A ) = G′(K B ). The value of λ at that point is one and we know the constraint binds. Holding τ B fixed and continuing to increase τ A leads the firm to increase K A in order to keep the constraint binding. This lowers the value of λ until it reaches zero, at which point the constraint no longer binds. Therefore, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the value of forgiving a dollar of excess limitation is worth, at most, one dollar to the investor.
It can be shown that for λ < 1 the allocation of capital to the low-tax country exceeds the allocation that maximizes pre-tax income, so that capital is allocated inefficiently in these cases.
An interesting result here is that for a fixed τ B and τ H (0 < τ H < τ B ), increasing τ A from the value at which the Lagrangian constraint is first binding to the value at which it no longer binds results in an increasing amount of capital being allocated to the low-tax country. That is, in this region, the low-tax foreign country can attract additional investment from the investor by raising its tax rate. This is shown in Figure 2 in the text using a numerical example.
A3. Efficiency Boundary
Comparison of the first-order conditions under the overall limitation and the per-country limitation shows the following: (1) When the investor is in an excess limit position at the efficient allocation of capital, OL Case I applies and the overall limitation is optimal (this also is true when at the efficient allocation of capital foreign taxes are exactly equal to home country taxes). (2) For 0 < λ < 1, the overall limitation can be more efficient or less efficient than the per-country limitation. Results will depend on the specific profit function. (3) For OL Case II with λ = 0, the per-country limitation is more efficient than the overall limitation.
Using the logic of Figure 2 , we see that two first-order conditions hold at the boundary. The first is that under the per-country limitation, after-tax marginal profits are equalized. The second condition that holds is under the overall limitation. Here the Lagrangian constraint that firms equalize their total tax bill across countries must hold. Low-Tax Country Tax Rate (Home country tax rate is assumed to be 35 percent) Low-Tax Country Tax Rate (Home country tax rate is assumed to be 35 percent and third country tax rate is assumed to be 50 percent) Low-Tax Country Tax Rate (Home country tax rate is assumed to be 35 percent and third country tax rate is assumed to be 25 percent) Low-Tax Country Tax Rate (Home country tax rate is assumed to be 35 percent and interest allocated to foreign sources is assumed to be 1 percent of foreign capital) Both Equally Efficient
